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 The goal of the protocol QKD BB84 is to allow a transmitter and a receiver 
which uses a quantum channel to exchange their keys and to detect the 
presence of eavesdropping attacks. In the present research, we investigate the 
effect of several eavesdroppers with both intercept-resend and cloning 
attacks. We will propose the different possible cases of the positioning of the 
eavesdroppers and their strategies of attacks; also we will calculate the 
mutual information for each case. The explicit expressions of the mutual 
information and quantum error clearly show that the security of the 
exchanged information depends on the numbers of the eavesdroppers and 
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The theory of information introduced by Claude Shannon in the forties [1],[2] is strongly exploited 
in quantum information specially the cryptography. The field of quantum information is always very young 
and it develops with great speed by comparing with the other axes of research theoretical and experimental. 
This is possible as a result of the experiments of quantum optics: Schrödinger's cats can be created and 
observed [3],[4],[5]. These developments certainly seemed impossible before the founders of quantum 
mechanics. Many scientific deceplins use quantum fundamentals to develop its techniques and algorithms 
[6]. There is also a design tool for quantum computers, since the invention of quantum error corrector codes 
[7]. This gives us more hope since much is to be done in this vast field of quantum information theory. 
Indeed the quantumcryptography has become a necessity with this development and BB84 is the first 
protocol to have been imagined and implemented [8]. The information is coded on the polarization of single 
photons, choosing two non-independent polarization basesto ensure safety.This protocol has undergone 
several variants [9],[10], and has been implemented many times.Furthermore, the quantum key-policy attribute-
based encryption scheme was devellioped by using the qutrits [11]. 
BB84 protocol was implemented fairly quickly, first in the form of a demonstration of principle then 
more operational devices [12],[13]. Quantum key distribution, often simply called quantum cryptography, is 
currently the only domain of quantum information where commercial systems are available.The development 
of cryptographic systems in the presence of noise has also stimulated research into classical information 
processing algorithms useful in quantum cryptography, such as reconciliation and privacy enhancement 
algorithms [14],[15],[16]. 
Other key distribution protocols have been proposed, either with qubits [12], or more recently with 
continuous variables. Other cryptographic applications have been studied, such as secret sharing or the 
Byzantine chord problem. The more specific exploitation of quantum entanglement has also led to dense 
coding [17], quantum teleportation [18] and other applications, also recently a new stady of Quantum 
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password sharing scheme using trusted servers is published [19]. In a previous work, we have presented the 
quantum key distribution with several intercept and resend attacks [20] and with several cloning attacks [21], 
and we have investigated the cases of quantum key distribution with several attacks via a depolarizing 
channel [22] [23] and partially non-orthogonal basis states [24]. Our aim in this paper is to study the effect of 
two groups of eavesdropping strategy; intercept-resend and cloning attacks on the behaviour of the mutual 
information between honest parties and the quantum error rate within the BB84 protocol. The paper is 
organized as follows. The protocol is detailed in section 2. Section 3 is devoted to the results and discussion, 
while section 4 is reserved for the conclusion. 
 
 
2. RESEARCH METHOD 
The quantum key distribution (QKD) can use several photon properties for the purpose of encoding 
information such as polarization, phase, quantum correlations or wavelength. The only requirement on 
quantum states is that they belong to mutually non-orthogonal Hilbert space basis. We use the polarization 
coding and we consider two bases: the first called rectilinear is represented by the Horizontal and Vertical 












These four states satisfy the following relations: 
 







All measurements made in the diagonal (rectilinear) base for photons prepared in the rectilinear 
(diagonal) base will give random results with equal probabilities. On the other hand, measurements made in a 
base identical to that of preparation of the states will produce deterministic results. At first, both parties who 
wish to communicate, traditionally called Alice and Bob agree that, for example, ( H , A ) represent the "0" 
value of the bit, and ( V , D ) have "1". Alice, the sender generates a sequence of random bits that she 
wants to transmit randomly; independently for each bit she chooses its coding base, rectilinear or diagonal. 
Subsequently, Bob receives these photons and uses a filter to read them. Nevertheless, some photons 
will be useless; it is the photons that have been polarized in a different base. These photons must not be taken 
into account in the key. To do this, a channel, which can be public, is used between Alice and Bob to 
determine which photons are useless. In our work we shoes to study when N+S eavesdroppers  
iE (i = 1,…..,N+S), were placed between Alice and Bob. These eaves droppers form two groups, each 
groupwill adopt a strategy of attacks; cloning or intercept-resend attacks, according to the model represented 
in Figure 1 and Figure 2. 
 
 
AliceQuantum Channel                                  Bob 
 
         E1     E2                 EkEk+1             EN          EN+1         EN+kEN+k+1              EN+S-1   EN+S 
 
The N eaves dropper swith cloning attacks The S eaves dropper swith intercept-resend attacks  
 
Figure 1. Model of N  cloning attacks followed by S  intercept-resend attacks 
 
 
According to Figure 1, Alice send a photon polarized which represents randomly 1 or 0, with equal 
probability 1/2, to Bob. Between two groups of eavesdroppers is placer on the quantum channel, the first one 
use cloning attack. Each eavesdropper ),...,1( NiEi =  clone with an operator U defined as:  
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iθ is the cloning angle, and it defined the force of attacks. 
 
 
Alice Quantum ChannelBob 
 
         E1     E2                 EkEk+1             EN          EN+1         EN+kEN+k+1              EN+S-1   EN+S 
 
The N eaves dropper swith intercept-resend attacks        The S eaves dropper swith cloning attacks 
 
Figure 2. Model of N  intercept-resend attacks followed by S  cloning attacks 
 
 
The second group use intercept-resend attacks. Each eaves dropper ),...,1( SNNiEi ++=  
intercepts, with probability iω , the photon emitted by the eaves dropper 1−iE , measures its polarization state 
and resends it, in its measured polarization state, to the eavesdropper 1+iE . However, in the second figure 
(Figure 2) the roles of the groups of eaves droppers are reversed, ie Alice send a polarised photon and each 
eavesdropper ),...,1( NiEi = from the first group intercepts the photon with probability iω and each 
eavesdropper ),...,1( SNNiEi ++= from the second group use the cloning operator U defined above. 
 
 
3. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
In this section we calculate the quantum error errQ  and the mutual information between Alice and 
Bob and between Alice and the mth eavesdroppers defined as follow: 
 
))0/1(()0/1())0/0(()0/0(1),( 22 ABABABAB PLogPPLogPBAI ++=  
))0/1(()0/1())0/0(()0/0(1),( 22 mmmm AEAEAEAEm PLogPPLogPEAI ++=  
With )0/0(1)0/1( ABAB PP −=  and )0/0(1)0/1( mm AEAE PP −=  
 
)/( AxyP  is the conditional probability that Bob or mE  receive a photon polarized horizontally 
(vertically) y = 0,1 with respect that Alice send a photon polarized horizontally (vertically) XA = 0,1. All this 
conditional probabilities depend on the models attacks described in the previous section; In fact, we will 
study the quantum key distribution and the two cases will be distinguished if the group of cloning attacks is 
placed first or last. The lost information between Alice and Bob corresponds to the maximum information 
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The quantum error errQ  is the value of the error probability errP  for which ),(),( EAIBAI = . However, for
errerr QP < , ),(),( BAIEAI < , while for errerr QP > , ),(),( BAIEAI >  
 
 
3.1. Quantum Key Distribution in the Presence of N Cloning Attacks Followed by S Intercept-Resend 
Attacks 
Based on Figure 1, the quantum error errQ  and the mutual information ),( BAI  between Alice and 












































PP θωω  
If all eavesdroppers collaborate between them and use the same cloning angle θ and identical attack 
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Since both types of attacks act on the quantum states viheculated on the channel, the conditional 
probabilities between Alice and Bob are different compared to those published in the case of several attacks 
of intercept and resend only [20] or cloning only [21]. However, the mutual information ),( mEAI between 
Alice and each eavesdropper mE is calculated according to conditional probability )0/0(mAEP . In fact, this 
probability changes according to the position of the eavesdropper: 
 


















iAEAE mm PP θθ And
( ))sin()cos(1
2
1)1/1()0/0( 1 θθ −+== mAEAE mm PP
 
if all eaves droppers mE (with Nm < ) have the 
same cloning angleθ .  
These results fit perfectly with those found in the case of several cloning attacks [21] Else if Nm > : In this 
case the two types of attacks will occur, and this will clearly appear in the formulas of conditional 








































































AEAE mm PP if all eaves droppers choose identical attack 
parametersθ and ω . 
 
3.2. Quantum Key Distribution in the Presence of N Intercept-Resend Attacks Followed by S Cloning 
Attacks 
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And if Ni ≤∀ ωω =i  and θθ =j SjN ≤<∀  , ( ))(cos1)21(14





 −+=  
 
The position of each eaves dropper mE  with its strategy of attack is a decisive element for the 
calculation of the conditional probabilities )0/0(
mAEP and subsequently the mutual information ),( mEAI .
  If Nm ≤ : All eaves droppers use intercept-resend attacks and the conditional probabilities will be identical 

















































1)1/1()0/0( mAEAE mm PP
ωω if ωω =i Ni ≤∀  
 
However if Nm > : The state arriving at the eaves dropper mE underwent before N intercept-resend 

















































Indeed in this last case if all ),...,1( NiEi =  have an identical attack probability ωω =i and all 















We have studied the quantum key distribution of BB84 protocol in the presence of several 
eavesdroppers with two different attack strategies cloning and intercept-resend attacks based on the 
calculations of the quantum error errQ  and the mutual information ),( BAI  between Alice and Bob and 
),( mEAI  between Alice and each eavesdropper mE  and We have detailed all the cases according to the 
eavesdropping position with the attacks type used. It is clear that the attacksparameters iω  and jθ , the 
number of theeavesdroppers, and their positioning on the quantum channelact strongly on the information 
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